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7KH/LNHOLKRRGRI7XUNH\¶V$FFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(XURSHDQ
Union: A Controversial Inquiry
Ashleigh Hebert
Introduction
7KH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ ³(8´  LV DQ XQSDUDOOHOHG HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO
partnership composed of twenty-seven European member states.1 The EU was
originally implemented to create an economic community, whereby member
states would become interdependent on one another.2 The hope was that this
interdependence would discourage conflict,
as war
would
become catastrophic.3 Over time, this community evolved into a supranational
organization with not only economic objectives, but social, cultural, political, and
international objectives as well.4 Since its formation, the European Union has
experienced enduring success and unity,5 and has grown from six members in
1952 to twenty-seven members, as of December 26, 2012.6 This number
excludes one acceding country, five candidate countries, and three potential
candidate countries.7
To become a member of the European Union, a country must go through
a rigorous screening process.8 To begin the process, a European state that
³UHVSHFWV WKH SULQFLSOHV RI OLEHUW\ GHPRFUDF\ UHVSHFW IRU KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG
IXQGDPHQWDO IUHHGRPV DQG WKH UXOH RI ODZ´ PD\ VXEPLW DQ DSSOLFDWLRQ WR WKH
Council of the European 8QLRQ ³&RXQFLO´ 9 If the Council accepts the
application, the country then becomes a candidate country, and accession
negotiations begin.10 However, acceptance is not automatic; for the Council to
approve the application, the candidate country must have stable democratic
institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities, a functioning
market economy, a government that is able to assume the obligations of
membership and that can implement EU rules and procedures into their domestic

1

Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basicinformation/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See id.
5
Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Feb.
1, 2013).
6
Enlargement, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-27members/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012).
7
Check Current Status, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/checkcurrent-status/index_en.htm (last updated Dec. 18, 2012).
8
Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (last updated Sept.
13, 2012).
9
Id.
10
Id.
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laws.11 If the Council unanimously agrees that the candidate country has met
these conditions (the "Copenhagen criteria"), accession negotiations
will begin.12
To conclude the next stage, negotiations must be conducted in thirty-five
separate chapters.13 Each of these chapters is geared towards a particular subject
matter with the goal of aligning the candidate country's laws with those of
the acquis communautaire: the legislation, regulations, and cases that embody
European Union law.14 A few examples of these chapters include the free
movement of goods and workers, education and culture, and the environment.15
The European Commission examines each chapter to determine whether the
candidate country is prepared for negotiations on that particular subject matter
and recommends whether negotiations should be opened.16 Once a chapter is
opened, negotiations are conducted with the candidate country, and the
completion time depends on how quickly the country reforms its laws.17 Once all
chapter negotiations are concluded and both sides are satisfied with the candidate
country's progress, an Accession Treaty is drafted.18 This treaty must then be
signed by all members of the European Union.19 After all member states and the
candidate country ratify the treaty, it will enter into force, and the
acceding country becomes a member state.20
Turkey is one of the five countries currently engaged in accession
negotiations.21 Although Turkey and the European Union have experienced close
relations since the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which
brought Turkey
into
the
customs
union,22
Turkey's
accession
remains immensely controversial. The contentious nature of Turkey's accession
largely stems from its Islamic heritage, which has caused the county
to struggle with the separation of church and state.23 Although the Republic of
Turkey was founded in 1923 on the notion that the state would be
secular,24 the country has difficulty upholding this principle, as ninety-nine
percent of the population is Muslim.25 Furthermore, there has been increasing
11

Id.
Steps Towards Joining, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towardsjoining/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2012).
13
Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 8.
14
Id.
15
Id. Other elements of the acquis communautaire include intellectual property law, agriculture,
taxation, social policy and employment, and external relations.
16
Steps Towards Joining, supra note 12.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Countries, supra note 5.
22
Turkey, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/turkey/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2012).
23
See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 30-32.
24
Id. ¶ 30; Th5.ø<(C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 2 (Turk.).
25
Turkey, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/candidatecountries/turkey/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
12
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public support for political parties that back theocratic governance, 26 or
alternatively, a plurality of legal systems categorizing individuals based on their
religious beliefs.27 Given the overwhelmingly Muslim population and increased
public support for alternative forms of governance, many individuals are
concerned that Turkey will not fit in with the predominantly Christian Europe.28
Furthermore, many feel that Turkey should not be admitted into the European
Union because it is not part of Europe, given its location as the "geographical and
cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East."29
Unfortunately, due to this religious ambience, it is unlikely that Turkey
will gain admission to the European Union in the near future. Turkey's struggle to
lessen religious influence has resulted in a history of governmental suppression of
individual, civil, and political rights in order to preserve the principles of
secularism and democracy, particularly when it comes to freedom of association
and freedom of religion.30 For example, Turkey has dissolved political parties
in favor of theocratic governance and has prohibited women from wearing
headscarves on university campuses.31 The European Court of Human Rights
³(&+5´ has occasionally upheld the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
7XUNH\ V ³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUW´ GHFLVLRQV32 leading one to believe that Turkey's
suppression of rights in favor of secularism and democracy is in conformity with
European Union standards. However, the ECHR has consistently condemned
Turkey for violations of freedom of association and freedom of religion.33
Furthermore, the
European
Commission
likewise denounces Turkey's law regarding the closure of political parties and its
failure to ensure religious freedom.34 Due to the importance of political parties
"in view of their essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of
26

E.g., Ran Hirschl, Symposium : Constitutional Courts in the F ield of Power Politics:
Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Funda mentalism : Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1819, 1849 (2004); see also Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
27
See Refah Partisi , 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 28.
28
See, e.g., Padideh Ala'i, Conference: Turkey: At the Crossroads of Secular West and Traditional
East: Introduction, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 680 (2009); S aying No to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2004; NATALIE TOCCI, TURKEY'S EUROPEAN FUTURE: BEHIND THE SCENES OF AMERICA'S
INFLUENCE ON EU-TURKEY RELATIONS 100-01 (N.Y. University Press 2011); W. COLE DURHAM,
JR., ET AL., ISLAM, EUROPE AND EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 301 (W. Cole Durham, Jr. et al. eds.,
2012).
29
Hirschl, supra note 26, at 1848.
30
See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Refah Partisi , 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.; United
Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R.; Shubra Ohri, Turkish Constitutional
Court Bans Kurdish Political Party, Turkey's Largest Minority Group Loses its Political
Voice, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Feb. 2, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/02/turkish-constitutionalcourt-bans-kurdish-political-party/.
31
See, e.g., S ahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Refah Partisi , 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
32
See, e.g., S ahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ; Refah Partisi, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
33
See, e.g., Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04, EUR. CT. H.R.
(2008), http://www.echr.coe.int; Democracy and Change Party v. Turkey, App. No. 39210/98, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2005), http://www.echr.coe.int; United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
34
Commission Staff Working Paper: Turkey 2011 Progress Report, at 9, 29-31, SEC (2011) 1201
final (Oct. 12, 2011); Comm ission Staff Working Document: Turkey 2010 Progress Report , at 7,
23-25, SEC (2010) 1327 final (Nov. 9, 2010).
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democracy"35 and the consensus among democratic societies of the fundamental
importance of freedom of religion,36 it is unlikely that the European Commission
will open, let alone close, negotiations on the "judiciary and fundamental rights"
chapter until Turkey protects these fundamental rights.37 In addition, even if this
chapter
is
eventually
closed, achieving
a
unanimous
vote
in
favor of accession will become increasingly difficult as enlargement of the
European Union continues.38 Moreover, several member states adamantly oppose
Turkey's accession, including two original members: France and Germany.39
I.

Political Parties in Tur key

A.

The Law

In order to become a member of the European Union, it is imperative that
Turkey amends its laws regarding the closure of political parties. Turkey's
Constitution states that "[p]olitical parties are indispensable elements of
democratic political life."40 +RZHYHU7XUNH\¶VConstitution goes on to renounce
this premise by indicating that:
The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political
parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state,
its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights,
the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation,
the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not
aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship
or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.41
If the Constitutional Court decides that a political party "has become a centre for
the execution
of" the activities prohibited in Article 68, it may dissolve the party.42 A political
party is detHUPLQHG WR KDYH EHFRPH D ³FHQWUH IRU WKH H[HFXWLRQ´ RI VXFK
activities when members of the party carry out the actions intensively, the
activities or views are shared by the decision-making or administrative organ of
the party, or the activities are carried out directly by the decision-making or
35

United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43.
E.g., Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶104; JINGHAO ZHOU, CHINA'S PEACEFUL RISE IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT: A DOMESTIC ASPECT OF CHINA'S ROAD MAP TO DEMOCRATIZATION 165 (Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2012); F reedom of Religion: Essential Principles, DEMOCRACY WEB,
http://www.democracyweb.org/religion/principles.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
37
See Steps Towards Joining, supra note 12.
38
Id.; Enlargement of the European Union F actsheet EUROPEAN UNION (2010),
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/elarg-factsheet_en.pdf.
39
Martin Kettle, Disgracefully, Turkey's E U Accession Bid is Going Nowhere Soon, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 28, 2010; Turkey's E U Bid on the Rocks as Tensions with Greek Cypriots Escalate , XINHUA,
Oct. 3, 2011.
40
Th5.ø<(C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 68 (Turk.).
41
Id.
42
Th5.ø<(C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 69 (Turk.).
36
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administrative organ.43 The Constitutional Court has successfully banned twentyseven political parties based on the prohibited activities listed in Article 68.44

B.

The Dissolution of Pro-Kurdish Political Parties
1. The United Communist Party of Turkey

The Constitutional Court dissolved the United Communist Party
³7%.3´ RQ-XO\45 The Court held that the mere mention of the word
"communist" in the name of a political party was enough to dissolve the party
under Section 96(3) of Law Number 2820.46 Moreover, because the party's
program referred to two nations, the Kurdish nation and the Turkish nation, the
TBKP could be dissolved for violating Article 68 of the Constitution by
encouraging separatism and seeking to dismantle the unity of the nation.47 The
Court came to this conclusion despite several passages in the party's program
FRQWUDGLFWLQJWKH&RXUW¶VFRQFOXVLRQVXFKDV
The [United Communist Party] will strive for a peaceful,
democratic and fair solution of the Kurdish problem, so that the
Kurdish and Turkish Peoples may live together of their free will
within the borders of the Turkish Republic, on the basis of equal
rights and with a view to democratic restructuring founded on their
common interests.48
Based on the above passage, it appears that the program seeks a society where the
Kurdish and
Turkish people live together in peaceful coexistence. Thus, the inquiry become
whether Turkey sought to ban the party solely because of its pro-Kurdish
program.
The European Commission on Human Rights ³+XPDQ 5LJKWV
&RPPLVVLRQ´ ZDVDVNHGZKHWKHUWKHGLVVROXWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGDYLRODWLRQRI$UWLFOH
11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects freedom of
association.49 The Human Rights Commission began with the premise that
dissolution constituted a violation of the parties' rights under Article
11.50 However, Article 11 also provides that "[n]o restrictions shall be placed on
the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and
43

Id.
Ohri, supra note 30.
45
United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R. ¶ 10.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. ¶ 9.
49
Id. ¶ 17. Note that the European Commission on Human Rights has since become obsolete; the
European Court of Human Rights was restructured so claims no longer have to go through the
Commission before the European Court of Human Rights will hear the case- this institution will
not appear elsewhere in this paper. The European Commission, on the other hand, is the executive
body of the European Union and is active.
50
United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 36.
44
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are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."51 The Human
Rights Commission thus indicated that the dissolution was permitted under the
Constitution and several sections of Law Number 2820 on the regulation of
political parties.
Next, the Human Rights Commission held that the dissolution was sought
to pursue a legitimate aim: "the protection of µnational security.'"52 It reasoned
that the program "could be regarded as openly pursuing the creation of a separate
Kurdish nation and consequently a redistribution of the territory of the Turkish
State."53 However, the Human Rights Commission concluded that the
interference was not necessary in a democratic society as required by Article
11.54 It stated, "there can be no democracy without pluralism;" furthermore,
freedom of expression is enshrined in the convention not only to favorably
received ideas, but also those that "offend, shock, or disturb."55 Thus, government
opposition to a solution to the Kurdish problem is insufficient to
prevent society from debating the issue in public forum.
The ECHR came to the same conclusion, but took a more direct route.
The Court noted that dissolution based on a political party's name was too
drastic a measure absent other considerations.56
Next, the Court
considered whether the party sought to promote separatism and division of the
Turkish nation.57 It held that the party merely sought recognition of
the Kurds and peaceful
coexistence
between the
Kurdish
and
58
Turkish peoples. It emphasized that an inherent characteristic of democratic
society is the ability to resolve the nation's problems through dialogue; thus, there
is no justification for disallowing discussion on the Kurdish problem.59 Given the
above-cited considerations, the Court concluded that the Constitutional Court of
Turkey violated Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights when it
dissolved the United Communist Party.60
2. The Dissolution of the Democratic Society Party
The Democratic Society Party ³'73´  DQRWKHU SUR-Kurdish political
party, was banned on December 11, 2009.61 The Constitutional Court of Turkey
accused the DTP of having connections with the Kurdistan Workers' Party,

51

Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 41.
53
Id. ¶ 40.
54
Id. ¶ 61.
55
Id. ¶ 43.
56
Id. ¶ 54.
57
Id. ¶ 55.
58
Id. ¶ 56.
59
Id. ¶ 57.
60
Id. ¶ 61.
61
Ohri, supra note 30.
52
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a group considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish government.62 Because
the Kurdistan Workers' Party has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy for several
decades, the Court held that the Democratic Society Party could be
dissolved for undermining national unity in violation of Article 68 of the
constitution.63 This decision led to thousands of protesters taking to the streets
because the Democratic Society Party was the only pro-Kurdish party
recognized in the country at the time of dissolution.64
3. Drawing Conclusions
Based on these cases and the Kurdish population's long-standing struggle
to achieve equality, it appears that the Turkish government will resist all efforts to
debate the Kurdish situation in public forum. It is noteworthy that a large portion
of the Kurdish population seeks a separate state through the exercise of the right
of self-determination.65 Therefore, the government has a defendable position
when it seeks to dissolve any pro-Kurdish political party, as Article 68 of the
Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party if its
program, statutes, or activities are in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the
nation. The government can thereby prevent pro-Kurdish parties from taking part
in the political process by grouping all Kurdish Turks into the group that seeks to
establish a separate state. This conclusion is strengthened in light of numerous
other cases where the government dissolved a pro-Kurdish political party solely
because of the party's desire to seek a solution to the Kurdish
problem.66 This pattern is both incomprehensible and demoralizing because
"[w]ithout well-functioning parties, governments and legislatures have little
chance
of
representing
wider
society
in
a
meaningful
67
way."
Furthermore, Turkish Kurds constitute nearly twenty percent of the
population;68 thus, by depriving one-fifth of the population of a voice, democracy
is rendered meaningless. In light of the government's oppression of the Kurdish
population, it appears the size of this minority has caused the Turkish
government to consider the group to be a significant threat to the unity of the
nation.69

62

Questions and Answers about the Case Against the Democratic Society Party , HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/09/questions-and-answers-aboutcase-against-democratic-society-party.
63
Th5.ø<(C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 68 (Turk.).; Sebnem
Arsu, Turkey Bans Kurdish Party, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009.
64
Ohri, supra note 30.
65
See, Kurds, COUNTRY STUDIES, http://countrystudies.us/turkey/28.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2012).
66
See, e.g., Democracy and Change Party, EUR. CT. H.R.; Dicle on Behalf of the Democratic Party
v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Freedom and
Democracy Party v. Turkey, 1999-VII EUR. CT. H.R.
67
Peter Burnell, Building Better Democracies: Why Political Parties Matter , WESTMINSTER
FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY (Dec. 2004), www.wfd.org/upload/docs/WFDBBD5_noprice.pdf.
68
Ohri, supra note 30.
69
Kurds, supra note 65.
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The dissolution of the United Communist Party of Turkey further supports
the conclusion that the Turkish government will continue to dissolve parties that
are sympathetic to the Kurdish minority. The United Communist Party was
formed on June 4, 1990; ten days later, the Chief Prosecutor applied to the
Constitutional Court for an order of dissolution.70 By ordering the termination of
a political party that had yet to participate in general elections, the
government deprived society of the ability to debate the party's platform. The
ECHR agreed with this view, calling this action "disproportionate to the aim
pursued and consequently unnecessary in a democratic society."71 It is difficult to
fathom how a party that has yet to have any political activity could constitute a
legitimate threat to democratic governance. Thus, this outcome demonstrates the
government's determination to prevent all public discussion regarding the Kurdish
situation in light of its belief that this minority constitutes a significant threat to
the unity of the country. As this pattern has continued for several decades, it is
likely that parties favoring a solution to the Kurdish situation will continue to face
dissolution until the Constitution is amended.

C.

The Near-Dissolution of the Currently Ruling Party

7KH -XVWLFH DQG 'HYHORSPHQW 3DUW\ ³$.3´  FXUUHQWO\ KDV D majority
of the 550 seats in
Parliament.72 In the latest election in 2011, AKP won 327 seats with 49.83
percent of the vote.73 Similarly, in the 2007 election, the party won 341 seats
with 46.58 of the vote.74 Given the popular support this party has garnered over
the years, it is remarkable that the party was nearly dissolved in 2008. When the
case involving the closure of the AKP party was brought before the Constitutional
Court, the Court was composed of eleven judges; political parties could be
dissolved if three-fifths of the Court voted in favor of dissolution.75 On May 7,
2010, Turkey took one step in the right direction by amending its Constitution to
make it more difficult to dissolve political parties.76 Article 146 now indicates
that the Constitutional Court will be composed of seventeen members, and Article
149 requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds to dissolve a political party.77
Unfortunately for the AKP, its case was brought before these amendments became

70

Olgun Akbulut, Criteria Developed by the European Court of Human Rights on the Dissolution
of Political Parties, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 46, 48 (2010).
71
United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R. ¶ 61.
72
Background Note: Turkey, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn /3432.htm.
73
Results for Grand National Assembly of Turkey, ELECTION GUIDE,
http://electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1628 (last updated Aug. 5, 2011).
74
Results for Grand National Assembly of Turkey, ELECTION GUIDE,
http://electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1147 (last updated Feb. 21, 2006).
75
UPDATE: A Guide to Turkish Public Law and Legal Research , GLOBALEX,
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/turkey1.htm#_Constitutional_Amendments (last visited
Feb. 1, 2013).
76
Th5.ø<(C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 146, 149 (Turk.).
77
Id.
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effective.78 Thus, if seven out of the eleven judges voted in favor of dissolution,
the ruling party of Turkey would be prevented from taking further political
action. Luckily for the AKP, it was spared by one vote: six judges voted in favor
of
dissolution.79
The
Court
concluded
that neither the
party's
program nor statutes supported an anti-secular nation.80 Moreover, it could not be
established that the party's objective was to destroy democracy or secularism "or
to damage the fundamental principles of the constitutional order through the use
of violence and intolerance."81 It will be interesting to see if these
amendments decrease the number of parties banned in Turkey. However, because
there are still numerous grounds for dissolution of a political party in Article 68, it
is likely that these amendments will spare few, if any, political parties.

D.

The Dissolution of Refah Partisi

5HIDK 3DUWLVL ³53´  DQRWKHU 7XUNLVK SROLWLFDO SDUW\ ZDV IRXQGHG RQ
July 19, 1983 and dissolved fifteen years later on January 16, 1998.82 The
Constitutional Court dissolved RP because it became a center of activities
contrary to secularism, an indispensable attribute of democracy.83 In support of
this conclusion, the Court looked to the conduct of several party members. To
start, it indicated that Refah's chairman had advocated a plurality of legal systems
categorizing individuals based on their religious beliefs when he stated, "[t]here
must be several legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose . . . which legal
system is most appropriate for him . . . . In our history there have been various
religious movements. Everyone lived according to the legal rules of his own
organization, and so everyone lived in peace."84 The Court further noted that the
chairman advocated a theocratic regime, instituted by force, if
necessary.85 He made a speech where he stated, "[w]e must ask ourselves . . .
whether this change will be violent or peaceful . . . . [W]ill it be achieved
harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their
PLQGV RQ WKDW SRLQW´86 The Court went on to analyze the conduct of several
members of parliament. Mr. Sevki Yilmaz called for the country to wage a
jihad.87 In a public speech, he indicated, "[o]ur mission is not to talk, but to apply
the war plan, as soldiers in the army."88 Finally, several other members called for
a regime based on sharia law, advocating violence if necessary.89
78

See Justice and Development Party, E.2008/1 (SPK), K.2008/2, TÜRKøYE CUMHURøYETø ANAYASA
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After analyzing the evidence, the Court concluded that Refah's leaders
and members were using their democratic rights and freedoms in an attempt to
replace democratic governance with a system based on sharia law.90 It went on to
state that "[d]emocracy is the antithesis of sharia;"91 the rules of sharia are
incompatible with the notion of democracy, where secularism prevents the state
from manifesting a preference for a particular religious belief.92 Consequently,
the party was banned, the five members who caused dissolution were stripped of
their parliamentary status, and those individuals were prohibited from
becoming a member of another political party for five years.93
The ECHR was asked to decide whether the dissolution violated the
DSSOLFDQW¶V ULJKWV WR IUHHGRP of association, as guaranteed by Article 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.94 In its decision, the Court stated that
the dissolution constituted an interference with the applicants' rights.95 The Court
further concluded that dissolution was prescribed by law;96 although anti-secular
activities ceased to be punishable under criminal law, the Turkish
Constitution provides that parties may be dissolved for engaging in antisecular conduct.97
The next part of the analysis required the Court to determine whether the
dissolution
sought to pursue a legitimate aim and whether it was necessary in a democratic
society.98
Without explanation, the Court indicated that dissolution sought to protect
national security and public safety, prevent disorder and crime, and protect the
rights and freedoms of others.99 Thus, the Court found that the government had a
legitimate aim in dissolving RP.
Next, in considering whether the interference was necessary, the Court
noted that it must concentrate on three points: (1) whether the risk to democracy
was sufficiently imminent; (2) whether the acts and speeches of the party's
members could be imputed to the party as a whole; and (3) whether the imputable
acts gave a clear picture of the type of anti-democratic society the
party advocated.100 First, the Court indicated that the risk to democracy was
sufficiently imminent in this case; there had been a considerable rise in the party's
influence and a strong probability that it would become the ruling party.101 In the
1995 general election, for example, RP obtained 22 percent of the votes and
received 158 seats in parliament.102 In the 1996 local elections, the party obtained
90
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35 percent of the votes; moreover, an opinion poll indicated that this percentage
could have risen to 67 percent within a few years.103
As for the second part of the ³necessary interference´ analysis, the Court
concluded that the views and speeches of Refah's members could be imputed to
the organization as a whole.104 The statements and acts of the chairman "could
incontestably be attributed to Refah" because he was the leader of his party, and
he had never indicated that the party had opposing views.105 The same conclusion
was reached in regard to the acts and speeches of party members because their
views were never criticized by Refah.106
FinDOO\LQWKHWKLUGSDUWRIWKH³QHFHVVDU\LQWHUIHUHQFH´ test, the Court held
that the acts and speeches of the party members set up a clear picture of the type
of anti-democratic society the party pursued.107 The members advocated a
plurality of legal systems that would categorize individuals based on their
religious beliefs.108 Such a system would be incompatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights because such governance would infringe upon the
principle of nondiscrimination, one of the fundamental principles of democracy,
by treating individuals differently based on their religion.109 Moreover, a regime
based on sharia would likewise be incompatible with the notion of democracy
because it would create a system where religion would intervene in all spheres of
public and where women would be treated unequally.110
In solidifying its conclusion, the Court indicated that the need to
dissolve Refah Partisi was particularly urgent because "Refah did not exclude
recourse to force in order to implement its policy". 111 In addition,
the sanction was proportionate to the constitutional violation because only five
members lost their seats in parliament; the remaining 152 members continued to
pursue their careers.112 Consequently, the dissolution of Refah Partisi and the
forfeiture of certain political rights did not violate Article 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.113

E.

Refah Partisi: An Inconsistent and Unprecedented Outcome

Although the ECHR supported Turkey's decision to ban RP, this is the
only political party dissolution case (with the Republic of Turkey as the
respondent state) where the ECHR did not find a violation of Article 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.114 Thus, this unprecedented decision
103
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does not indicate that Turkey's law on political parties is aligned with European
standards, and consequently, the ease with which political parties can be banned
will continue to inhibit Turkey's accession into the European Union. However, it
then becomes a matter of distinguishing this case from other dissolution
cases. From an outsider's prospective, it appears that the ECHR was alarmed
by the party's willingness to use force to achieve a new form of
governance incompatible with democracy.115 The Court stressed that a system of
governance based on sharia law would be contrary to the principles of
democracy.116
In addition, it condemned the use of force to achieve a political
objective.117 Although the Court strongly believes that democracy is incompatible
with governance based on sharia law, it cannot be said that the holding would be
the same had the party's members stressed a transition through peaceful
means. After all, the Court has stressed that "freedom of expression as enshrined
in Article 10 is applicable . . . not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those
that offend, shock or disturb."118 7KXV LQ WKH &RXUW¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DOWKRXJK
sharia law may appear to be utterly incompatible with the notion of democratic
governance, political parties have a right to debate the preferred form of
governance.
Moreover, the Court has stressed that in considering whether to ban a
party, an important factor to take into consideration is the party's willingness to
resort to violence to achieve its political objectives.119 The ECHR has indicated
that it "finds nothing in [the party's program] that can be considered a call for the
use of violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic
SULQFLSOHV 7KDW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V view is an essential factor to be taken into
consideration."120 Consequently, it appears that the advocacy of a system of
governance incompatible with democracy, coupled with the threat of violence to
achieve that objective, is reprehensible enough to uphold the Constitutional
Court's decision to ban RP.

F.

European Standards Regarding the Closure of Political Parties

Although Turkey has implemented several reforms to make it more
difficult to dissolve
Party, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Yazar and Others v. Turkey, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R./; Dicle on Behalf of the
Democratic Party, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, 1999-VII EUR. CT.
H.R.; United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R.; Socialist Party and
Others v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
115
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 123,129.
116
Id. ¶123.
117
Id. ¶132.
118
United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R., ¶ 43.
119
See F reedom and Democracy Party, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 40
120
Id.; Bulent Algan, Dissolution of Political Parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey: An
Everlasting Conflict Between the Court and the Parliament? , 60 ANKARA ÜNIVERSITESI HUKUK
FAKÜLTESI DERGISI 809, 821 (2011).
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political parties, further reforms are necessary before its law will conform with
European
standards. The Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of
Europe, indicated that there are a number of common features,
despite wide diversity, among European countries with regard to provisions
governing political party activity.121 To begin, the authority to initiate a
prohibition procedure is rarely entrusted with the prosecuting authorities.122 Such
a decision should be discretionary, as initiating the procedure itself may have
grave
consequences (due to the
sensitivity of
cases
restricting
fundamental rights).123 Thus, in the countries with rules on party dissolution,
the decision to initiate a proceeding is largely political.124 In Germany, for
example, the decision lies with the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament,
or the Federal Council.125 Because Turkey is unique in that competence lies with
the Chief Public Prosecutor,126 the Commission believes that the procedural
aspect of dissolution is not in line with European standards.127 By providing one
individual with this authority, the entire procedure is left up to one man or
ZRPDQ¶VXQIHWWHUHG discretion, without a democratic check or balance.128
The Commission also examined European standards regarding the criteria
for prohibiting and dissolving political parties.129 It concluded that there
are several national requirements, including, but not limited to, organizations that
threaten the existence or sovereignty of the state or its basic democratic order; that
foster social, ethnic, or religious hatred; that use or threaten to use violence; that
are fascists or Nazis; and those that are criminal associations.130
Although the national requirements vary depending on historical experience, the
Commission indicated that no European system includes all of these criteria,
and the majority of the systems includes only one or two.131 Turkey, however,
lists eight criteria in Article 68 of the Constitution, some of which are listed in
broad terms, leaving room for manipulation.132
Another broad distinction the Commission draws is the frequency with
which dissolution is sought. The Commission indicated, "in Turkey a high
number of political parties have been prohibited over the years. This [is in stark]
contrast with the prevailing European approach, under which political parties are
prohibited or dissolved only in exceptional cases."133 In Europe, there have been
121
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Id. ¶ 34.
125
Id.
126
Th5.ø<(C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 69 (Turk.).
127
See Opinion, supra note 121, ¶ 35.
128
Id. ¶¶ 35, 86
129
Id. ¶¶ 23-30.
130
Id. ¶ 23.
131
Id. ¶ 25.
132
Id. ¶¶ 73-74;Th5.ø<( C80+85ø<(7øANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 68 (Turk.).
133
Opinion, supra note 121, ¶ 3.

No. 1

7 X U N H \ ¶V  $ F F H V V L R Q

15

few dissolutions, and each concerned marginal and extremist parties in Germany
and Spain.134 Thus, outside Turkey, this remedy is utilized only in exceptional
circumstances. In the Commission's view, a remedy as extreme as dissolution
should be used only when there is a threat of or use of violence.135 Although this
standard is somewhat stricter than that in most European countries, the ECHR
seems to support this view, upholding dissolution in Refah Partisi because of the
threat of violence to instill an undemocratic regime.136

G.

Conclusions on Political Party Closure in Turkey

It is unlikely that Turkey will become a member of the European Union
in the foreseeable future because of the dissimilarities that exist between its
political party dissolution laws and that of other European nations. For Turkey to
complete its accession negotiations, it will need to align its laws with those of the
European Union in thirty-five subject-related chapters.137 Because political
parties are essential to effective democratic governance, Turkey will likely
experience difficulty in completing the "judiciary and fundamental rights"
chapter.138 Although there is a permitted margin of appreciation (a doctrine the
court uses to take into consideration that the Convention may be interpreted
differently in each member state), because of the diversity among European
nations, Turkey's law appears to be too distinct, and thus, incapable of
reconciliation with the European standard. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
European Commission will open, let alone close WKH FKDSWHU RQ ³MXGLFLDU\ DQG
IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV´XQWLO7XUNH\ VODZLV reformed.
The European decision-making bodies unanimously agree that Turkey
needs to reform its law. The European Commission has stressed that Turkey
needs to bring its political party closure law in line with European
standards.139 The Venice Commission similarly concluded that Turkey's political
party "reforms have not been sufficient to fully bridge the gap between the
Turkish rules and the standards of the ECHR and the Venice
Commission."140 Because of the consensus of opinion among the international
community, Turkey will need to narrow the gap between its law and those of other
European countries before it will be admitted into the European Union.
I I.

F reedom of Religion in Tur key

A.

The Law

Although Turkey's law regarding freedom of religion is more in line with
European standards than its law regarding the dissolution of political parties, the
134
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European Commission continues to pressure Turkey to uphold its constitutional
protections.141 The Turkish Constitution provides that "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious
services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not
violate the provisions of Article 14."142 Article 14 further provides that the rights
and freedoms provided for in the Constitution shall not "be exercised with the aim
of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and
endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish
Republic based upon human rights."143
Although Article 14 seems
to diminish freedom of religion, this limitation is consistent with European
standards because its objective is to impose limitations on individual rights and
freedoms when necessary to protect the interests of society as a whole.144

B.

Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey

Turkey's law on freedom of religion is inconsistent with European
standards regarding
compulsory
religious education in
primary
and
145
secondary schools.
Turkey's Constitution provides that "[i]nstruction in
religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of
primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be
subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of
their legal representatives."146
Because of this law, Hasan Zengin and his daughter, Eylem Zengin,
submitted a request to the Provincial Directorate of National Education seeking an
exemption from the religious culture and ethics courses.147 The Zengins were
adherents to Alevism, a branch of Islam that differs from Sunni Islam in many
aspects. For example, adherents to Alevism reject the sharia law, defend women's
rights, and express their devotion through song and dance instead of attending a
mosque. The Zengins felt that their family should be exempt from religious
courses because the compulsory nature of the education was contrary to
secularism.148 Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights allows
parents to choose the type of education their children receive.149 Their exemption
request was denied because the Turkish Constitution expressly provides for
compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools.150
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Following this denial, the applicants brought their claims to the ECHR,
alleging a violation of Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.151 Similar to the Universal Declaration, Article 2 provides that a
state must respect parents' rights to ensure their children receive education in
accordance with their religious beliefs.152 In response to this allegation, the
ECHR noted that its case law indicates that the objective of Article 2 is to ensure
pluralism in education, an essential characteristic for democratic
governance.153 Thus, although the court acknowledged that educational
curricula falls within the competence of state parties, a state may not "pursue an
aim of indoctrination" that could be perceived as disregarding parents' religious
beliefs.154 It explained that a democratic society has an obligation to be impartial
and neutral towards various religious beliefs to ensure pluralism.155
In order to decide whether the curriculum is taught objectively, the
ECHR looked to the religious course syllabus and textbooks. According to the
syllabus, the subject matter was to be taught in accordance with the principles of
seculariVP DQG LQ D ZD\ WKDW ZRXOG ³IRVWHU D FXOWXUH RI SHDFH DQG a context of
WROHUDQFH´156 Thus, these objectives were compatible with the principles
LQFRUSRUDWHG LQ$UWLFOH  WKURXJK WKH (&+5¶V FDVH ODZ157 However, the Court
went on to note that the syllabus provided for instruction on the Koran and
Mohamed; likewise, the seventh grade syllabus provided for instruction on
several fundamental aspects of Islam.158 The issue became more problematic
after the ECHR examined the textbooks used by the Turkish government in
primary and secondary education. These textbooks did not provide a general
overview of the world religions; rather, they "provide[d] instruction in the major
principles of the Muslim faith . . . such as the profession of faith, the five daily
prayers, Ramadan, [and] pilgrimage."159 In addition, students must take exams on
the Koran and the daily prayers.160 The ECHR went on to conclude that although
Turkey gives priority to the Islamic faith, it is the majority religion in the country,
and thus, Islam-focused religious instruction alone cannot be viewed as
indoctrination.161
This, however, was not the end of the analysis: the ECHR considered the
allegation that no instruction was provided on the Alevi faith.162 It noted that a
large portion of the Turkish population adheres to Alevism.163 Thus, because
Alevism was not taught and religious instruction was heavily focused on Sunni
151
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Islam,164 Turkey's curriculum did not meet Article 2's requirement of objectivity
as required by the case law. Finally, the ECHR decided whether Turkey's law
respects parents' religious views.165 If the law allows children to be exempted
from religious courses, the Sunni Islam-heavy curriculum would be permitted (in
light of the fact that 99 percent of the Turkish population adheres to the Muslim
faith) as long as it became more objective.166 In 1990, Turkey's Supreme Council
for Education indicated that children who adhere to the Jewish or Christian faith
could apply for an exemption.167 The Court concluded that this exemption
procedure did not provide sufficient guarantees to concerned parents.168
Requiring students to reveal their religious affiliation to apply for an
exemption poses a problem under both the Turkish Constitution and Article 9 of
the Convention.169 Moreover, by disallowing the possibility of exemption to
the Muslim faith, the government was indirectly acknowledging that Islam
heavily influenced the curriculum.170 Lastly, because the decision to exempt was
discretionary, there were no obligatory safeguards for parents who have religious
beliefs different from those taught.171

C.

Conclusions on Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey

Turkey's failure to change its practice regarding compulsory religious
education will likely hamper the country's accession into the European
Union. Unlike Turkey, almost all European states allow students to opt out of
compulsory religious courses or make attendance optional.172
Thus,
Turkey will have difficulty concluding negotiations on chapter twenty-three²
judiciary and fundamental rights²until it can adequately protect religious
freedom, a hallmark of modern-day democracies.173 Moreover, negotiations on
this chapter have yet to be opened; thirteen out of thirty-five chapters have been
opened (one has been closed), but chapter twenty-three remains untouched.174 In
addition to the lack of progress over the last six-and-a-half years,175 the European
Commission continues to criticize Turkey for its failure to implement
the Zengin decision. In its 2010 report, the Commission indicated that Turkey had
not yet implemented the Zengin judgment, which requested Turkey to conform to
Article 2 after finding that classes did not give a general overview of world
164
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UHOLJLRQV EXW ³SURYLGHG VSHFLILF LQVWUXFWLon in the guiding principles of the
Muslim faith."176 This disfavor carried over to the 2011 progress report; the
ECHR indicated that although the Ministry of National Education prepared new
textbooks that will include information on Alevism, religious courses remain
compulsory under Turkish law.177 Furthermore, the Commission pointed out that
the Zengin decision remains unimplemented, exemptions are rare, alternative
classes are not provided for exempted students, and there have been reports that
students who do not attend religious courses receive lower grades.178

D.

Sahin v. Turkey: the Headscarf Case

As with Refah Partisi , Sahin demonstrates the European Court of Human
Rights' willingness to consider Turkey's unique religious atmosphere when
determining how far to allow it to stray from European standards. The
circumstances of the headscarf case are as follows. Leyla Sahin was a fifthyear medical student studying at the Cerrahpasa Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul
University.179 She completed her first four years at the Faculty of Medicine at
Bursa University and wore the Islamic headscarf daily.180 However, during
her time at Istanbul University, the university issued a circular that required
faculty to prohibit students wearing the Islamic headscarf from attending lectures,
tutorials, and courses.181 In accordance with this circular, Ms. Sahin was denied
access to an examination and lecture and was also prohibited from enrolling in
classes for the following semester.182 Despite warnings, Ms. Sahin continued
to wear her headscarf and was consequently suspended for a semester after taking
part in a protest against the school dress code.183 She tried unsuccessfully to get
the administration to annul the circular;184 she then left the school to continue her
studies at Vienna University.185
Ms. Sahin took her case to the European Court of Human Rights,
arguing "that the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher
education constituted an unjustified interference with her right to freedom of
religion, in particular, her right to manifest her religion."186 The court began with
the premise that the circular interfered with the applicant's right to manifest her
religion in a particular place, a university.187 In deciding whether the interference
176
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was prescribed by law, the court reiterated its case-law, indicating that the term
"prescribed by law" means a basis in domestic law that is both accessible and
understandable in a way that would allow the individual to foresee the
consequences of a given action.188 Thus, in contending that the restriction was
not prescribed by law, Ms. Sahin argued that the law was inconsistent, and
therefore, the consequences of an action were unforeseeable because the circular
was incompatible with Section 17 of Law Number 2547. Section 17 provides,
³>F@KRLFHRIGUHVVVKDOOEHIUHHLQLQVWLWXWLRQVRIKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQSURYLGHG that it
does not FRQWUDYHQH WKH ODZV LQ IRUFH´189
The Court held
that "law" includes statutory law and case law, and a year after Section 17 of Law
Number 2547 was enacted, the Constitutional Court of Turkey indicated that
authorizing women to wear headscarves in universities is contrary to the notion of
secularism.190 This decision was binding and published in the Official Gazette.191
Moreover, the school adopted memorandums and resolutions well before the
applicant enrolled there;192 these documents indicated that the Constitutional
Court ruled that religious attire may not be worn in universities.193 Thus, it should
have been clear to Ms. Sahin that she would be refused access to classes and
examinations if she did not remove her headscarf.194
In deciding whether the restriction sought to pursue a legitimate aim, the
court stated that the restriction was implemented to protect the rights and
freedoms of others and to protect public order.195 The Court did not elaborate on
this point, but the Court appears to agree with Turkey's proposition that
prohibiting the headscarf prevents the state from favoring one religion over
another.196 Finally, the Court was left to decide whether this restriction was
necessary in a democratic society.197 The Court stated, "[i]n democratic
societies . . . it may be necessary to restrict freedoms to manifest one's religion or
belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that
everyone's beliefs are respected."198 It is important that the state
demonstrates mutual tolerance for all religious beliefs, and thus remains
impartial.199 In addition, because there is currently no uniform standard in Europe
regarding the significance of religion in society or the proper relationship between
religion and the state, permitted limitations are decided on a case-by-case
basis.200 Thus, states are allowed a margin of appreciation in deciding what
measures to implement.201 Through this reasoning, the limitations were upheld in
188
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this case. The Court emphasized that because the majority of the population is
Muslim, and the headscarf is seen as a compulsory religious obligation, students
who choose not to wear it may be deprived of their free will upon seeing others
who comply with this religious duty.202 Similarly, prohibiting the headscarf
prevents the state from manifesting a preference for a particular religious belief,
which is an important notion in Turkey because of its long-standing struggle to
separate religion from the political discourse.203
Lastly, the Court had to decide whether the means pursued to achieve the
objective were proportional.204 It held this condition was satisfied because
practicing Muslims are free to manifest their religion outside the university
environment.205 In addition, headscarves are not the only religious symbol
prohibited in universities; other religious attire is similarly banned.206
Consequently, there was no breach of Article 9 of the Convention, which protects
an individual's right to manifest his or her religious beliefs.207

E.

Sahin v. Turkey: Another Refah Partisi?

Because of the utmost importance of freedom of religion in democratic
societies, it is surprising that the European Court of Human Rights upheld
Turkey's decision to ban the headscarf on university campuses. The
distinguishing factor in this case appears to be the permitted margin of
appreciation when it comes to limiting freedom of religion.208 In Europe, there is
no consensus on the proper relationship between the church and the state, and
there is wide diversity in the degree to which headscarves are regulated.209 In
France, for example, the notion of secularism is incorporated into the
Constitution, and French law prohibits students in state primary and secondary
schools from wearing religious attire that "overtly manifest[s] a religious
affiliation."210 On the other hand, students are permitted to wear the headscarf in
countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom.211 The Netherlands goes a step further and permits
teachers to wear the headscarf.212
Because member states' laws vary on the permissibility of wearing
headscarves in the school environment, the willingness of the court to
restrict freedom to manifest one's religious beliefs is fathomable.
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The European Court of Human Rights is not merely a state court that upholds
state notions of religious freedom, but it is also a supranational court that must
look to the standards in various countries when creating its case law. When there
is not a uniform view on a particular issue, it appears the ECHR is willing to give
the respondent state a margin of appreciation in deciding what policies are
appropriate to protect the rights of society as a whole. The Court also appears to
respect the notion of state sovereignty until there is a clear consensus on the
ability of states to regulate religious attire.

F.

Arslan v. Turkey: Imposing Limits on Sahin v. Turkey

Arslan v. Turkey demonstrates that the European Court of Human Rights
is unwilling to permit states to stray too far from the rights guaranteed in Article 9
of the Convention. In this case, Mr. Ahmet Arslan and 126 Turkish nationals
belonged to Aczimendi tarikaty, a religious group.213 In October 1996, they met
for a religious ceremony. Afterwards, they toured the Ankara streets "while
wearing the distinctive dress of their group, which . . . was made up of a turban,
'salvar' (baggy 'harem' trousers), a tunic and a stick."214 They were arrested
and convicted of violating laws that prohibit headgear and religious attire from
being worn in public other than for religious ceremonies.215 Because of these
convictions, Mr. Ahmet Arslan and the other Turkish nationals petitioned the
European Court of Human Rights claiming that the convictions violated Article 9
of the Convention.216
In determining whether there was a violation of Article 9, the Court held
that there was an interference with the right to manifest one's religion.217 It also
held that the interference was prescribed by law and "pursued the legitimate aims
of protection of public safety, prevention of disorder and protection of the rights
and freedoms of others."218 However, Turkey was unable to establish the
necessity of this interference in a democratic society. 219 The applicants were
punished solely for wearing religious attire in a public place.220 Moreover, there
was no evidence that the group constituted a threat to public order or sought to
exert their religious views on others.221 In addition, the applicants did not hold an
official
status, and
thus, laws
concerning
civil
servants
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were inapplicable.222 Finally, as opposed to other cases where freedom to
manifest one's religion was subject to restrictions, these individuals were not
convicted of wearing religious attire in a public establishment where religious
neutrality might trump the freedoms laid out in Article 9.223 For these reasons, six
of the seven judges voted that the convictions violated Article 9.224
Conclusion
It is unlikely that Turkey will become a member of the European Union
in the foreseeable future because it is unwilling to effectively protect freedom of
association and freedom of religion. In regards to the dissolution of political
parties, both the European Commission and the Venice Commission agree that
significant constitutional reform is needed to align Turkey's law with European
standards.225 Although several European countries have guidelines that provide
for dissolution in exceptional circumstances, these laws are rarely
effectuated.226 Specifically, the Venice Commission noted that outside
Turkey, dissolution laws were implemented solely to ban marginal and extremist
parties in Germany and Spain.227 Thus, because the international community
condemns the excessive manner in which Turkey has utilized its dissolution law,
it is unlikely that the European Commission will open, let alone close the
"judiciary and fundamental rights" chapter.228 The particular importance of
political parties "in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy"
strengthens this conclusion.229
Additionally, Turkey's failure to adequately protect freedom of religion
will equally prevent negotiations on the "judiciary and fundamental
rights" chapter.230 In regards to compulsory religious education, the European
Commission continues to condemn Turkey for its failure to implement
the Zengin decision.231 This denouncement stems from Turkey's digression from
the European standard: almost all European countries permit students to opt out
of religious education or make attendance optional.232 Furthermore, Turkey is too
willing to restrict freedom to manifest one's religious beliefs. Although the
European Court of Human Rights upheld Turkey's decision in Sahin v.
Turkey,233 this departure from its past holdings appears to be the result of the
permitted margin of appreciation when it comes to limiting freedom of
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religion.234 In Europe, there is no consensus on the proper relationship between
the church and the state, and there is also wide diversity in the degree to which
countries regulate headscarf wear.235 However, the ECHR was unwilling to allow
Turkey to stray too far from freedom to manifest one's religion: the court
denounced Turkey's decision to impose sanctions on individuals who
wore religious attire in a public area.236 Thus, overall, the ECHR appears to
believe that Turkey's law needs to be aligned with European standards.
Consequently, it is unlikely Turkey will gain admission to the European
Union until it can adequately protect religious freedom, a hallmark of modern-day
democracies.237
It is also unlikely that Turkey will gain admission to the EU because
accession requires a unanimous vote by all members of the European
Union.238 Thus, even if this chapter is eventually closed, achieving a unanimous
vote in favor of accession is improbable because several countries, notably France
and Germany, adamantly oppose Turkish accession.239 Until Turkey can persuade
the union that it belongs among the European countries and that it is capable of
reforming its laws to meet European standards, Turkey will remain outside this
supranational organization.
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